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West Virginia Law Review
Volume 69 February, 1967 Number 2
Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept
Of Administrative-Constitutional Law*
FRArx I. SThONG**
In the pages of Volume 44 of the West Virginia Law Quarterly,
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, then a young law teacher in this
College of Law, found in certain decisions of the supreme court of
this State and of the Supreme Court of the United States the para-
dox that "Separation of powers, the cardinal principle upon which
the federal and all the state governments are founded, a great Amer-
ican contribution to the science of government, violates the due pro-
cess clausel"' To Professor Davis this result seemed exceedingly
absurd,' and in this adverse judgment he has had with him the
great weight of scholarly authority.'
0 This article, and one to follow in a subsequent issue of this Law Review,
constitute the tenth Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures, given at the WestVirginia University College of Law, October 27 and 28, 1966.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Dean and Professorof Law Emeritus, The Ohio State University.
The writer-lecturer desires to record his appreition of the honor paid
him by the invitation to follow distinguished predecessors in the Donley
Lecture Series, and of the many courtesies shown him during his visit to the
host institution for presentation of the Lectures. He also desires to record his
indebtedness to a former colleague, Professor Charles C. Callaban of Ohio
State, for assistance in the early development of some of the basic concepts
in this analysis.
' Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia - A
Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270, 293 (1938). The paradox
is put a total of three times; the other formulations appear at Id. 292, 370.
2 Such an absurd result surely proves the unsoundness of either the
United Fuel Gas case or the Ben Avon case, or both." Davis, supra note 1.
In the Fuel Gas case the Supreme Court of West Virginia was of the opinion
that the doctrine of separation of powers prevented it from substituting itsjudicial judgment for the administrative judgment of the State Public Service
Commission. The Ben Avon case is one of the four decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States which is given extensive attention in the course of
this article.3 The agreement with Professor Davis is implicit if not explicit in the
great mass of writing critical of Ben Avon and two of its three judicial
companions, Crowell v. Benson and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States. The general familiarity with this critical writing precludes the neces-
sity of citation at this introductory point.
[ III ]
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Acting on the assumption that in the academic world no statute
of limitations operates to foreclose reconsideration of a legal prob-
lem at any later date, it is my purpose: first, to offer a resolution to
this seeming paradox and to pursue the ramifications of the distinc-
tion in constitutional theory which provides the basis for clarifica-
tion; second, to tackle a related judicial enigma which also has
troubled Professor Davis and other scholars, pursuing the implica-
tions of the proffered explanation for a more sympathetic attitude
toward the much-maligned concept of "constitutional fact."
I. JuDiaAL REviEw OF CONSTITUIONAiITY UNDER DInFERMG
TH.onws oF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
The paradox found and condemned by Professor Davis, that the
doctrine of separation of powers is violative of due process, is satis-
factorily resolved through a realization that American constitutions,
federal and state, embrace two distinct political theories which in
their application can produce seeming conflict. One of these is the
familiar political theory of the separation of governmental powers;
the other, for which there appears to be no agreed-on label, would
seem most accurately described as the political theory of the legi-
timacy of governmental powers. Scholarship traces each well back
of the time of Christ: separation of powers to the Greeks;4 legiti-
macy of powers to Israel of the Old Testament.5
The theory of separation of powers originated in a division of
social classes designed to fractionalize the totality of government
power, thereby mitigating its full impact upon the individual.
This was the theory of mixed government developed by Greek
philosophers. "But only the western Christian world," observes an
able student of separation of powers, "undertook to analyze political
processes from a functional point of view and in so doing hit upon
the distinctive features of certain basic functions or 'powers'."" John
Locke identified the three functions of government: the legislative,
the federative, and the executive. It is also familiar learning that
Montesquieu, "primarily interested in the problem of securing an
4 Dickinson, Checks and Balances, 3 ENCYC. Soc. Sc. 363 (1930); Par-
gellis, The Theory of Balanced Government, in READ, THE CoNsTTrrtON
RECONSIERED 37 (1938).
'TRUEBLOOD, THE PrDicA.mENT oF MoDnaN MA" 78-79 (1944); TRUTE-
BLOOD, FOUNDATIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 18-19 (1946).6 Friedrich, Separation of Powers, 13 ENCyC. Soc. Sci. 663 (1934).
[Vol. 69
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independent status for judges," refashioned Locke's federative pow-
er into what we recognize as the modern executive power, and
transformed Locke's executive power to execute the laws into the
judicial power of the courts. Influenced by Montesquieu, Black-
stone also emphasized the independence of the judiciary in a separ-
ation-of-powers context. "Montesquieu and Blackstone had of
course great authority with our American Fathers".! Finally, legal
historians agree with Professor Friedrich that "It was of the greatest
moment that these constructions happened to fit the constitutional
experience of most of the American colonies, where a governor, a
distinct colonial legislature and a fairly independent judiciary had
come to constitute the essential organs of government and where af-
ter the Declaration of Independence a brief experiment with legis-
lative supremacy leading to a major tyranny had made the people
ripe for a practical application of the celebrated theme."'
Never has the theory of separation of powers been more suc-
cinctly stated than by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the course of his
classic dissent in Myers v. United States.9 Taing issue with Chief
Justice Taft as to the scope of Presidential removal power, Justice
Brandeis declared that "The doctrine of the separation of powers
was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency,
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was,
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction inci-
dent to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy."' 0 Protection of the
individual through segmentation of total governmental power is
without question one of the political theories upon which the
American constitutional system is rested."
"Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of the "Separation of Powers,"
2 U. Cm L. REy. 385, 393 (1935). This is the classic article on the doctrine in
this country.8 Friedrich, supra note 6, at 664.
9 272 U.S. 5(1926).
'
0 Id. at 293.
11 Great names beyond that of Louis Brandeis can be cited to this
proposition. Mr. Justice Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865,
869-70 (1960); Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 625 (1952); Dean Pound, The Place of thejudiciary in a Democratic Polity, 27 A.B.A.J. 133, 138-39 (1941); CHIEF
JusTIcE VAmEmwr.T, THE SEPAuAION OF PoWERS 35-37 (1953).
Professor Sutherland in his recent volume, CONSTITurIONALISM IN
AiMmsc (1965), treats "The principle of form, that government should be
segmented," as one of five basic elements of American constitutional theory.
"Government must not be monolithic lest it be too strong for our liberties."
3
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The second political theory incorporated into American con-
stitutions, that of the legitimacy of governmental powers, finds its
origins in the development of moral law among the Hebrews. Pro-
fessor Elton Trueblood cites the familiar Old Testament accounts
of David and Bathsheba and of Naboth's vineyard,' 2 as most re-
vealing of the doctrine, "perhaps the most disturbing that the hu-
man mind can hold,.... that Idng and commoner are equally subject
to the moral law."'3 Carried over "into the Christian tradition'
this conception that "the king is as much subject to the moral law
as is the humblest subject, because he did not make it. . . .has
been at the base of countless revolutions." 4
The eminent constitutional historian, Charles McIlwain, found
the basic idea "expressed at Rome, under the Principate and after-
ward, in the lox regia by which the people conferred on the Em-
peror an authority in very broad terms, yet certainly defined."'5
While the concept disappeared as an operative principle of govern-
ment in the centuries that followed, nevertheless "the basic con-
ception of a fundamental law is never entirely absent, and in the
legal sources it survived the encroachments of despotism and the
fall of the Empire, eventually to influence new races for centuries
to come."' 6
A major point of influence was feudal law, for, to quote Profes-
sor McIlwain again, "one of its most striking features is the promi-
nence of the negative check on government inhering in the rights
of feudal vassals, which no lord, not even a king, may lawfully in-
Id. at 5. Professor Kauper, reviewing this volume, stresses the close theoretical
kinship between separation of powers and federalism.
The principle of the segmentation and diffusion of power had a double
aspect. Understood to mean the separation of powers, it developed in
England as a matter of practice rather than of theory, and it remained
for the colonists and constitution makers in this country, under the
influence of Montesquieu's thinking, to identify it as a fundamental
constitutional principle. Its second aspect is found in the principle offederalism, fundamental to the American constitutional system and clearly
a response to the situation faced by the thirteen colonies in their attempt
to achieve unity amidst diversity.' Kauper, Book Review, 79 HAav. L.
REv. 1324, 1326 (1966).
12 ThruLOOD, 1OC. cit. supra note 5. The Old Testament passages are
to be found in II Samuel 11-12 and I Kings 21, respectively.
3 TRuEBLOOp, THE PantazicAwwNT or MoDERN MAN 78 (1944).
14 Ibid.
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fringe."' 7 The confrontation between John and his barons at Run-
nymede stemmed from the former's alleged violation of the latters'
feudal rights. The concept of the illegitimacy of certain govern-
mental acts is underwritten by Magna Carta, from which we of
this nation inherited it by rather direct succession. Necessarily a
feudal document, Magna Carta was as a whole destined to lose its
force with the decline of feudalism and the rise of the nationalist
States. But Chapter 39, renumbered 29 in the 1225 reissue of Magna
Carta which "became the final Magna Carta of the English law,"
had a flexibility that enabled it to adapt to new political conditions.
Through seven and a half centuries of fateful history and broaden-
ing interpretation,"8 this Chapter, rechristened by Lord Coke as the
due process provision, has served as the central embodiment of
the theory that excessive powers of government are ultra vires.
It is essential to an understanding of the American constitution-
al system to perceive that the objective of each of these two politi-
cal theories is precisely the same, viz. achievement of protection of
the individual against the more aggravated thrusts of governmental
action.'9 But while the objective is identical, the method differs.
With the theory of legitimacy of governmental powers there is a di-
rect assertion that some acts of government have no legal validity.
Because the principle of limitation on governmental powers is thus
directly asserted, this political theory can appropriately be dubbed
the theory of direct limitation. With separation of powers, per
contra, the theory is that by the forced separation of the several dis-
tinctive powers of government there will occur a friction in their
exercise such that the severity of the impact of government upon the
individual will be mitigated. Inasmuch as this protection inures to
the benefit of the individual as a by-product of the friction among
the separated departments of government, this political theory can
be described as the theory of indirect limitation."0
"I bid.
'8 STRoNG, A&m.uucAu CoNsTrrutnoNAL LAw 43-47 (1950).
,9 See Dean Pound and Justice Black, both supra note 11, for a clear
grasp of this fundamental political proposition.20 Professor McIlwain differentiated between the two types of limitation
through use of the terms "positive checks" and "negative checks." This usage
appears to be common among political scientists. Functionally, the Mc-
lwainian terms are preferable to those suggested in the text. Nevertheless, the
terms "direct limitation" and "indirect limitation" will be used in the present
article because they are more expressive of the singleness of purpose of the
two methodologically different political theories.
5
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Incorporation into American constitutions of both of these po-
litical theories of limitation, the direct and the indirect, unquestion-
ably made for constitutional complexity. The abstractness of the
concepts involved justifies graphic illustration, even if crude. Illus-
tration 1 depicts the application of the theory of separation of pow-
ers, together with that of the functionally related theory of federal-
ism; Illustration 2 portrays the application of the theory of direct
limitation; Illustration 3 reveals the complexity arising from the
superimposition of one upon the other. In all three Illustrations the
area of the larger circle represents the total of all conceivable gov-
ernmental power.
\ I 1 1 1 I I
\ 1 I1I
N I I t l
Illustration 1 Illustration 2
Illustration 3
In Illustration 1 the vertical lines effect the allocation of govern-
mental power, not only as among the three principal departments
but within each department as well (bicameralism in the legislative
branch, division of executive function in the States, trial and appel-
late courts within the judiciary); the horizontal line denominates the
division between federal and state power. The area of the smaller
concentric circle in the second Illustration measures the total of the
powers of government which can validly be exercised in view of
the direct limitations expressed in the controlling constitution; the
difference between this area and the greater area of the larger cir-
cle constitutes the limbo of ultra vires action by government. Note
[Vol. 69
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in Illustration 3, where the two theories are combined, that in each
segment there is a shaded area depicting powers of government,
which, although lawfully exercisable under the theory of separa-
tion of powers, are unlawful to government under the theory of
direct limitation. In a sense, then, the principle of separation of
powers can "violate" the due process clause. Yet this is neither
paradoxical nor absurd; rather, it is the necessary consequence of
American adoption of both theories of limitation. Such action may
have been unwise-more of this hereafter-but the result should be
clearly understandable.
Subsequent discussion will disclose that, just as direct limita-
tions will in some contexts foreclose governmental action entirely
proper under indirect limitations, so it is true that in other situations
indirect limitations will operate to invalidate acts of government
which do not offend direct limitations. This "political fact" can be
read from Illustration 3, although not with the clarity possible in
the converse situation; a challenged act may fall within the smaller
circle, thus escaping indictment under direct limitation, yet it may
lie within a segment of that inner circle other than that from which a
governmental department asserting its authority to act in a given
instance derives its constitutional power.
Numbers 47 to 49 of the Federalist Papers disclose Madison in
search of an effective and satisfactory device for providing "some
practical security of each [class of governmental power], against the
invasion of the others." Each of the methods tried or proposed in
that great experimental period after Independence he found want-
ing. Although at this time of writing Madison treated the council
of censors, the oath, and other such divices as techniques for infore-
ing the separation-of-powers principle of the proposed federal con-
stitution, they were equally adaptable to the implementation of di-
rect limitations and well may, like the New Jersey oath required of
legislators, have been so intended. In Number 80 of the Federalist,
Hamilton rejected the direct negative in favor of the courts for en-
forcing upon the States the observance of all constitutional limita-
tions proposed for them, federalistic and direct. A year later, in
the first Congress, Madison cited the "independent tribunals of jus-
tice" in answer to the contention there would be no effective way
to enforce the proposed Bill of Bights." Inasmuch as the new
21 1 A i.s oF CONG. 439 (1789).
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American constitutions were thought of as fundamental law, and
for centuries courts had been the accepted interpreters of law, it was
inevitable that the use of the courts for this function would be sug-
gested.22
There is, consequently, little to support the thesis that judicial
review of constitutionality was in any way an act of judicial usurpa-
tion. On the other hand, any attempted demonstration that the
Constitution provides for it is fraught with difficulties. Much de-
bated has been the question whether the text can be read clearly to
recognize the power. 3 Less debated, but far more fundamental,
is the issue of the instrument's consistency with the necessary predi-
cates of judicial review of constitutionality, in light of the co-or-
dinate character of the three departments of government so clearly
postulated by it. Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison4 satis-
factorily explained judicial refusal to give effect, in litigation be-
fore a court, to a governmental act inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion, but not why such a determination of unconstitutionality binds
the other branches of the government. This power, which is the es-
22 Professor Walter F. Dodd explained the ultimate resort to "the court
as a body to enforce constitutional restrictions" in terms of the differing
nature of the judicial function, as contrasted with the legislative and executive
functions. Dodd, judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80
U. PA. L. REv. 54, 55 (1931). But when the beginnings of judicial review
of constitutionality can be traced back to 1139, MCILw 1W, op. cit. supra note
15, at 250-51, it would seem more realistic to find the explanation in a tradi-
tion that courts construe the law.
23 Professors Hart and Wechsler are satisfied that "The grant of judicial
power was to include the power, where necessary in the decision of cases, to
disregard state or federal statutes found to be unconstitutional." HAnT &
WECHSLFR, Tim FEDmAL CourTs Am TE FEDmuAL SYsTEm 17 (1953).
Per contra, Learned Hand was of the opinion that "when the Constitution
emerged from the Convention.., the structure of the proposed government,
if one looked to the text, gave no ground for inferring that the decisions of
the Supreme Court . . . were to be authoritative upon the Executive and the
Legislature." HAND, ThE Bn. OF IGHTs 27 (1958). Professor Corwin could
not find in constitutional text authority for constitutional judicial review, but
was certain the Framers intended it. Corwin, Marbur v. Madison and
The Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MicH. L. REv. 538 (1914). Dean
Rostow has expressed the view that "Whether or not this was the intention of
the Founding Fathers, the unwritten Constitution is unmistakable." Rostow,
The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193 197(1952). Professor Kadish takes the same view as did Judge Hand so ?ar as
the instrument is concerned, but is of the same opinion as Dean Rostow
regarding the unwritten practice. Kadish, Judicial Review in the United States
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia 37 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 5
(1958). Professor Kadish observes that 'The establishment of judicial review
in Australia was accompanied by none of the travail which marked its reception
in the United States:" Ibid.
245 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
[Vol. 69
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sential element of judicial review of constitutionality, is difficult to
reconcile with the theory of the judiciary as a coordinate branch of
government, which is so clearly the theory of the Constitution of the
United States and of all the State constitutions. No attempt at
reconciliation has ever satisfactorily met Mr. Justice Gibson's analy-
sis in Eakin v. Raub."5 The basis of judicial review of constitution-
ality must be found in the unwritten, rather than the written, Con-
stitution.
Very possibly this is one explanation of the fact that the full de-
velopment of judicial review of constitutionality was a much slower
process than is almost universally assumed. Marbury v. Madison
claimed this power for the United States Supreme Court only in
the defensive sense of safeguarding the Court's original jurisdiction
from congressional enlargement A clearer case of defensive judicial
review of constitutionality for the protection of the judicial power
against legislative tinkering had been Bayard v. Singleton," the
decision of the supreme court of North Carolina which is generally
acknowledged to have been the strongest precedent for constitution-
al review prior to the Philadelphia Convention. Of Bayard v.
Singleton Louis Boudin wrote with rare insight, "Not only did this
case not involve the confiscation laws as such, but it did not even
involve the question of trial by jury, which it is commonly alleged
to have involved. For the question was not whether a trial ought
to be with or without a jury, but whether there should be a trial at
all-i.e., whether the judges had a right to hear the cases. And one
need not be a supporter of the Judicial Power in any of its formula-
tions in order to believe that the Judiciary have a right to hear and
determine cases."27
If Mr. Boudin had no quarrel with the North Carolina case, what
made his two-volume work on Government by Judiciary so severe
25 12 S. & B. 330, 334 et. seq. (Pa. 1825). Dividing the powers of the
judiciary "into those that are political and those that are purely civil," Mr.justice Gibson insisted that the former, "by which one organ of the government
is enabled to control another," may not be exercised in the absence of an
express constitutional grant, which the constitution of Pennsylvania did not
contain. This distinction between two very different types of judicial power
undergirds the second Lecture. Its significance in the present context is well
developed in the sympathetic evaluation of Gibson's views by Kutler, John
Bannister Gibson: Judicial Restraint and the Positive State, 14 J. Pun. LAw
181 1965).6 1N.C. (1 Martin) 48 (1787).
27 1 BouDN, GovEnNmENT BY JunIcAY 66 (1931).
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a condemnation of what he called the Judicial Power? The explana-
tion lies in the extension of constitutional judicial review to acts of
Congress; to separation-of-powers conflicts between legislative and
executive branches, which are of no such concern to the courts as are
those conflicts involving the courts' own powers; to federalistic
questions; and to direct limitations on the powers of government.
These several forms of extension occupied a considerable portion
of the nineteenth century; the end of the full development can be
dated as late as 1890, the year in which Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Minnesota28 subjected rate regulation to the rigors of substantive
due process. That the great portion of the development of judicial
review of constitutionality, measured at least in terms of signifi-
cance, postdates Marbury v. Madison is the insight of a commenta-
tor on the development of American constitutional law. Observed
he: "It is with Fletcher v. Peck [1810] that the unforeseen possibili-
ties of judicial review begin to appear."29
As judicial review of the constitutionality of governmental acts
expanded to embrace all aspects of both major forms of constitu-
tional limitation, American courts inevitably became involved in the
complexities of the American constitutional system. Professor Da-
vis, in that portion of his 1938 article in the Quarterly from which
he was quoted at the outset, was concerned with a situation where
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States, had seemed to invali-
date the West Virginia pattern of finality of utility rates administra-
tively fixed which the supreme court of the State had found to be
required by its interpretation of the State constitution's provision
for the division of governmental power.3  We are now in a position
to understand how it can be that one type of constitutional limita-
tion, here the direct, imposes restrictions on governmental power
not resident in the other, here the indirect.
Contemporaneously, Professor Walton Hale Hamilton was strug-
gling with the paradox of Mr. Justice Bradley in dissent in the Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. case which I have suggested can be used to close
the period of developmental expansion of constitutional judicial re-
28 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
29 W/,,,r, T,, (,ROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (1942).
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view.3' The seeming paradox lay in the fact that, whereas Mr. Jus-
tice Bradley had been with the dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 2 he later entered dissent in the Milwaukee case wherein the
constitutional views of the former minority were to attain majority
status." Reasoning logically from the principle-of-separation of
powers, Mr. Justice Bradley concluded that the Minnesota legisla-
ture had but exercised legislative power and hence had committed
no constitutional rape. What for the decisive moment he failed to
see was that, while no indirect limitation had been exceeded by the
legislature of Minnesota, there was presented by the litigation the
distinct question as to whether the relatively new direct limi-
tation of federal due process did nevertheless invalidate the statute.
If commentators of the brilliance of Professor Hamilton have had
difficulty with differences in result in judicial enforcement of direct,
as compared with indirect, constitutional limitations, Mr. Justice
Bradley can be excused the confusion in his mind at a time when
the Supreme Court of the United States was still relatively new at
direct constitutional judicial review. For until after the Civil War
the major experience of American courts, federal and state, had
been with the implementation of indirect constitutional limitations.
Cases of the above type are not the only ones wherein the two dif-
ferent theories of limitation lead to contrary results, thus producing
confusion in a constitutional system which has seen fit to employ
both and to use the courts as the enforcing agency for both. In some
situations the state of development of the theory of separation of
powers, as contrasted with that of ex post facto, due process, free-
dom of speech or similar provision, will result in invalidity of gov-
ernmental action valid under direct limitation. Two major deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States, divided in time by
167 years, are illustrative of this converse possibility.
Calder v. Bul 4 involved the challenge of a special act of the
Connecticut legislature which after setting aside a probate court's
refusal to admit a will to probate, had granted a new hearing despite
the running of the statutory time limit for appeal. The will having
been admitted on the second hearing, the heir appealed to the su-
31 Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in EnAD, THE CoNsrrru-
TIoN R coNsmEmm 167, 183 (1938).3283 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36, 111-24 (1873).3 Chicago, M. & St. P. By. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 461-66 (1890).
343 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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preme court of errors of Connecticut for relief. That appeal was un-
availing, for the Connecticut Constitution of 1776 continued, as "the
Civil Constitution of this State," the Charter of Charles Second un-
der which legislative grants of new trials had become accepted
usage. Had there been available to the Supreme Court of the United
States a constitutional prohibition on State blending of governmental
power, it seems entirely likely that invalidation of the Connecticut
law would have followed. The sitting Justices regarded the legisla-
tive act as judicial in nature and expressed themselves as committed
to the invalidation of legislative action in conflict with express con-
stitutional provisions. Invalidation was the early fate of similar acts
of States incorporating separation-of-power restrictions in their con-
stitutions."5 But there being in the federal constitution no such
indirect limitation on the States, the Court was thrown back on the
ex post facto guaranty. Some scholars have since challenged the
Court's interpretation of this clause as restricted to criminal legisla-
tion, yet the restriction has held. 36 Although Mr. Justice Chase was
barely restrained from "anticipatory invalidation" on grounds later
available through adoption of the fourteenth amendment, viz. that
this was a taking of the property of A for the benefit of B, the courts
have not found, in analogous facts, that quality of property right
which offends due process."7 Incensed as he was at the injustice
done the heir, even Mr. Justice Chase had his doubts that the heir
possessed "property" by virtue of the first action of the probate
court and the running of the statute. If such a statute as Connecti-
cut's is unconstitutional, it is so by reason of a separation-of-powers
requirement in the State Constitution.
The quite recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. Browm" is even more instructive. The
statutory provision replaced by section 504 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, section 9h of the Taft-
Hartley Act, had been sustained by the Court against attack as
violative of the first amendment.' It is true that section 504, al-
though having the same purpose as section 9h, directs its sanction
15 Holden v. James 11 Mass. 396 (1814); De Chastellux v. Fairchild
15 Penn. St. 18 (1850). Contrast the long continuation in Connecticut of
legislative grants of new trials. E.g., Wheeler's Appeal, 45 Conn. 306 (1877).
36 Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MxcH. L. PEv. 315 (1922).
17 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Note, 25
CoLum. L. 11Ev. 470 (1925); Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E.
670, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935).
38 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
19 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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against the union official, not the union; and on this basis the great
majority of a United States court of appeals, sitting en banc, held
the later provision unconstitutional under the first and fifth amend-
ments." Despite this differentiation, Broum is difficult to reconcile
with Douds on the issues of direct constitutional limitation on which
decision turned in the court of appeals. Nevertheless, the court
left in doubt the question whether Section 504 is inconsistent with
the direct-type limitations of the Bill of Rights. But the Court left
no doubt, against sharp challenge by a minority of four Justices, that
the legislative sanction offended the bill of attainder clause, which
as the Chief Justice observed constitutes "an implementation of the
separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exer-
cise of the judicial function, or more simply - trial by legislature." 41
It surely is significant that at least a majority of the Court has
quite recently felt that in the circumstances of Douds and Brown
an indirect constitutional limitation effects a clearer protection of
the individual than does a direct limitation. The latest relevant ac-
tion of the Court provides further reinforcement for this view. In
Dennis v. United States," an attempted challenge of Taft-Hartley's
section 9h itself, the question dividing the Court was whether peti-
tioners had position to dispute the constitutionality of the older stat-
utory provision; but for the entire Court the constitutional issue
itself involved bill of attainder and not Bill of Bights.
In not all situations do the two basic theories of constitutional
restriction produce divergent results in one direction or its converse.
Analysis suggests, and Supreme Court decisions confirm, that appli-
cation of the theories will at times produce the same result. Where
this is so no confusion arises, although this fact may unwittingly
serve to enhance confusion when results differ. Again, two celebrat-
ed Supreme Court decisions are illustrative. Fletcher v. Peck43 is
Exhibit A. Today we treat it as Marshall's generative decision on
the contract clause. So it was; yet even a cursory reading of his
opinion makes it clear that to Marshall and his Court the Georgia
law was unconstitutional on a multiplicity of grounds, some expres-
40 Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964).
41 Brown v. United States, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
42384 U.S. 855 (1966).
43 10 U.S. (6 CranCh) 87 (1810).
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sive of direct constitutional limitations and some of indirect. Note
his conclusion:
It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court, that, in
this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia
was restrained, either by general principles which are common
to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the con-
stitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the
estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be
constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and
void."
Marshall's reference to "the particular provisions of the constitution
of the United States" is clearly to the bill of attainder, ex post facto,
and contract prohibitions of article I, section 10. To Marshall the
Georgia act violated all three of these constitutional restrictions
But more than this he doubted the act's validity even in the absence
of such constitutional provisions. For, after stating the facts of the
case, a friendly lawsuit if ever there was one, he launched imme-
diately into the following discourse:
It may well be doubted, whether the nature of society and
of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative
power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found,
if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired,
may be seized without compensation.
To the legislature, all legislative power is granted; but the
question, whether the act of transferring the property of an in-
dividual to the public, be in the nature of legislative power, is
well worthy of serious reflection.
It is the peculiar province of the legislature, to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application of
those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty
of other departments. How far the power of giving the law
may involve every other power, in cases where the constitution
is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be, definitely
stated.45
44 Id. at 139.4 5Id. at 135-36.
[Vol. 69
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By contrast, neither theory of constitutional limitation availed in
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,46 decided
toward the close of Taney's Chief Justiceship. The issue was again
title to land, plaintiff claiming under a levy of execution and de-
fendant under sale by a United States marshal pursuant to a dis-
tress warrant issued, and seizure made, under a congressional act
of 1820. That act authorized summary procedure against United
States collectors of revenue found on audit to be owing the United
States treasury. Inasmuch as plaintiff's judgment and levy post-
dated the action of the federal marshal, a favorable decision for
plaintiff depended upon successful challenge of the constitutional-
ity of the administrative process by which defendant set up his title.
The Court's opinion is unusually interesting for the way in which
consideration of direct and of indirect limitation is interrelated. In
order to demonstrate this, it will be necessary to quote rather lib-
erally from the case.
The Court first considers plaintiffs assertion that the summary
process provided by the act of 1820 violated article III of the Con-
stitution which defines and locates the judicial power.
It must be admitted that, if the auditing of this account,
and the ascertainment of its balance, and the issuing of this
process, was an exercise of the judicial power of the United
States, the proceeding was void; for the officers who perform-
ed these acts could exercise no part of that judicial power....
The question, whether these acts were an exercise of the
judicial power of the United States, can best be considered
under another inquiry, raised by the further objection of the
plaintiff, that the effect of the proceedings authorized by the
act in question is to deprive the party, against whom the war-
rant issues, of his liberty and property, "without due process of
law"; and therefore is in conflict with the fifth article of the
amendments of the constitution."
"Taking these two objections together," the Court examines the
meaning of due process against the background of English and
early American understanding of this equivalent of the "law of the
4659 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
47 Id. at 275.
15
Strong: Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-Cons
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
land" chapter of Magna Carta. Its conclusion some five pages later
is that:
Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to
the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of
the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the
proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to
be due process of law, when applied to the ascertainment and
recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of
customs, unless there exists in the constitution some other pro-
vision which restrains congress from authorizing such pro-
ceedings.48
With this the Court returns to the argument of plaintiff based
upon separation-of-powers:
That the auditing of the accounts of a receiver of public
money may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act, must be
admitted. So are all those administrative duties the perform-
ance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts
and the application to them of rules of law .... But it is not
sufficient to bring such matters under the judicial power, that
they involve the exercise of judgment upon law and fact.
United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40. It is necessary to go
further, and show not only that the adjustment of the balances
due from accounting officers may be, but from their nature
must be, controversies to which the United States is a party,
within the meaning of the second section of the third article
of the constitution. We do not doubt the power of congress
to provide by law that such a question shall form the subject-
matter of a suit in which the judicial power can be exerted. The
act of 1820 makes such a provision for reviewing the decision
of the accounting officers of the treasury. But, until reviewed, it
is final and binding; and the question is, whether its subject-
matter is necessarily, and without regard to the consent of con-
gress, a judicial controversy. And we are of the opinion it is
not.49
Without much doubt, the majority attitude of constitutional
historians, of political scientists, and of constitutional lawyers is re-
481d. at 280.
4 9 1d. at 280-281.
[Vol. 69
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flected in the incisively expressed views of Professor Charles MeId-
wain. He had no use for the "positive checks" of indirect limitation,
insisting that the Framers failed to heed "the lesson of all past con-
stitutionalism" when they added separation of powers to the "express
negative checks of the bill of rights" and regretting the demand he
found "for the restoration of all our former 'checks and balances' "
as protection against regimentation."0 A friction theory of constitu-
tional limitation is likely to have little appeal in an age that em-
phasizes efficiency; a direct approach to the problem of bounding
governmental power seems preferable. We ought not to be using a
horse-and-buggy theory in an air age, the reasoning goes.
Some there are, of course, who have remained unconvinced. A
notable exception has been Professor Carl Friedrich of Harvard,
whose sympathetic treatment of the doctrine of separation of powers
in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences insists that "there is a
strong indication that some sort of separation of powers remains the
only effective guaranty of government according to law."' One
may surmise that his own personal European experience raised
serious doubts in his mind regarding the ability of direct limitation
to withstand strong legislative or executive pressures. Yet it remain-
ed for Learned Hand to set off a wave of reconsideration of the rel-
ative merits of direct and indirect limitation at least as concerns the
desirability and effectiveness of the use of constitutional judicial re-
view in their vindication. His celebrated address in commemora-
tion of the 250th anniversary of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, although now an event of over twenty years ago,
continues to carry a powerful impact.2 Here are three of his clas-
sic passages:
A constitution is primarily an instrument to distribute political
power; and so far as it is, it is hard to escape the necessity of
some tribunal with authority to declare when the prescribed
distribution has been disturbed. Otherwise those who hold the
purse will be likely in the end to dominate and absorb every-
thing else, except as astute executives may from time to time
4 0 Mckw.m, op. cit. supra note 15, at 246.
5' Friedrich supra note 6, at 665.52 Hand, TA Contribution of an Independent judiciary to Civilization in
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL CoUr oF MASSACHuSETrS 59 (1944). reprinted in
HAND, THE SrnuT oF LmERTY 172 (Dilliard ed. 1952). The quoted passages
are from the reprint.
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check them by capturing and holding popular favor .... I do
not mean that courts should approach such constitutional
questions as they approach statutes, and they have never done
so when they knew their business; constitutions can only map
out the terrain roughly, inevitably leaving much to be filled in.
The scope of the interstate commerce power of Congress is an
ever present instance. It is impossible to avoid all such oc-
casions, but it was a daring expedient to meet them with judges,
deliberately put beyond the reach of popular pressure. And yet,
granted the necessity of some such authority, probably inde-
pendent judges were the most likely to do the job well. Be-
sides, the strains that decisions on these questions set up are
not ordinarily dangerous to the social structure. For the most
part the interests involved are only the sensibilities of the offi-
cials whose provinces they mark out, and usually their re-
sentments have no grave seismic consequence.
But American constitutions always go further. Not only do
they distribute the powers of government, but they assume to
lay down general principles to insure the just exercise of those
powers. This is the contribution to political science of which we
are proud, and especially of a judiciary of Vestal unapproach-
ability which shall always tend the Sacred Flame of Justice. Yet
here we are on less firm ground. It is true that the logic which
has treated these like other provisions of a constitution seems on
its face unanswerable. Are they not parts in the same docu-
ment? Did they not originally have a meaning? Why should
not that meaning be found in the same way as that of the rest
of the instrument? Nevertheless there are vital differences.
Here history is only a feeble light, for these rubrics were meant
to answer future problems unimagined and unimaginable.
Nothing which by the utmost liberality can be called inter-
pretation describes the process by which they must be applied.
Indeed if law be a command for specific conduct, they are not
law at all; they are cautionary warnings against the intemper-
ance of faction and the first approaches of despotism. The an-
swers to the questions which they raise demand the appraisal
and balancing of human values which there are no scales to
weigh. Who can say whether the contributions of one group
may not justify allowing it a preference? How far should the
capable, the shrewd or the strong be allowed to exploit their
[Vol. 69
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powers? When does utterance go beyond persuasion and be-
come only incitement? How far are children wards of the state
so as to justify its intervention in their nurture? What limits
should be imposed upon the right to inherit? Where does re-
ligious freedom end and moral obliquity begin? As to such
questions one can sometimes say what effect a proposal will
have in fact, just as one can foretell how much money a tax
will raise and who will pay it. But when that is done, one has
come only to the kernel of the matter, which is the choice be-
twveen what will be gained and what will be lost. The diffi-
culty here does not come from ignorance, but from the absence
of any standard, for values are incommensurable. It is true
that theoretically, and sometimes practically, cases can arise
where courts might properly intervene, not indeed because the
legislature has appraised the values wrongly, for it is hard to
see how that can be if it has honestly tried to appraise them
at all; but because that is exactly what it has failed to do, be-
cause its action has been nothing but the patent exploitation of
one group whose interests it has altogether disregarded. But
the dangers are always very great. What seems to the losers
mere spoliation usually appears to the gainers less than a
reasonable relief from manifest injustice. Moreover, even were
there a hedonistic rod by which to measure loss or gain, how
could we know that the judges had it; or-what is more impor-
tant-would enough people think they had, to be satisfied that
they should use it? So long as law remains a profession (and
certainly there is no indication that its complexities are decreas-
ing) judges must be drawn from a professional class with the
special interests and the special hierarchy of values which that
implies. And even if they were as detached as Rhadamanthus
himself, it would not serve unless people believed that they
were. But to believe that another is truly a Daniel come to
judgment demands almost the detachment of a Daniel; and
whatever may be properly said for judges, among whom there
are indeed those as detached as it is given men to be, nobody
will assert that detachment is a disposition widespread in any
society. ...
Nor need it surprise us that these stately admonitions refuse
to subject themselves to analysis. They are the precipitates of
"old forgotten far off things and battles long ago," originally
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cast as universals to enlarge the scope of the victory, to give it
authority, to reassure the very victors themselves that they have
been champions in something more momentous than a passing
struggle. Thrown large upon the screen of the future as eternal
verities, they are emptied of the vital occasions which gave
them birth, and become moral adjurations, the more imperious
because inscrutable, but with only that content which each gen-
eration must pour into them anew in the light of its own experi-
ence. If an independent judiciary seeks to fill them from its own
bosom, in the end it will cease to be independent. And its inde-
pendence will be well lost, for that bosom is not ample enough
for the hopes and fears of all sorts and conditions of men, nor
will its answers be theirs; it must be content to stand aside
from these fateful battles. There are two ways in which the
judges may forfeit their independence, if they do not abstain.
If they are intransigeant but honest, they will be curbed; but
a worse fate will befall them, if they learn to trim their sails to
the prevailing winds. A society whose judges have taught it to
expect complaisance will exact complaisance; and complaisance
under the pretense of intepretation is rottenness If judges are
to kill this thing they love, let them do it, not like cowards with
a kiss, but like brave men with a sword.53
The intellectual plight which has been caused for many by this
notable address, casting in masterly prose the convictions of one
of America's greatest jurists, is illustrated by the writings of Charles
Curtis. Author of a stimulating volume on the Court, Mr. Curtis
originally urged the desirability of direct judicial review in the
area of civil liberties.5" Yet, although at first he stubbornly resisted
the Hand reasoning, he finally yielded to a view which he could
not rebut to his own satisfaction.5 Unconvinced, on the other hand,
is Professor Chester Antieau; he is sharply critical of those "eminent
jurists today who oppose the use of the Bill of Rights in examining
into the constitutionality of legislative enactments-who would,
in effect, for these purposes carve the Bill of Rights out of our Con-
stitution."56 Further illustrative is the exchange of views in the
Harvard Law Review fifteen years ago between Mr. Elliot Richard-
53 Id. at 176-81.
54 CunTis, LIONS UND n THE TimoNE oh. 16 (1947).
55 CurTis, LAW AS LAnGE AS L='a 102 (1959).56 Antieau, Our Sometimes Injudicious Review, 50 GFo. L. J. 765, 776(1962).
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son and Dean Eugene Rostow,17 wherein the former came near
to embracing the Hand position while the Dean stoutly rejected
'Judge Learned Hand's monkish rule of complete abstinence" in
issues of direct limitation.58
The debate on the relative merits of direct and of indirect limita-
tion must go on inside the Court, as it does outside. There is
significance in the resurgence of the bill of attainder prohibition,
first in United States v. Lovett 9 and now recently in United
States v. Brom,60 following the demise of any significant Supreme
Court limitation on Congressional power either under federalism6'
or in the delegation of legislative power to the Executive and the
Administrative.62 The Steel Seizure Case63 also suggests that life
still remains in judicial enforcement of some indirect limitations.
Clearly, the Court shows no sign of retreating from the exercise
of constitutional judicial review with respect to direct limitations
protective of civil and political rights. Indeed, its activism in this
regard, lately illustrated by its apparent success in the great venture
into the political thicket of reapportionment,64 suggests the para-
doxical possibility that this form of constitutional judicial review
may be metamorphosing into what is in effect a mechanism for
57 Richardson Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65
Htnv. L. RFv. 1 (1951); Rostow, supra note 23.58 In his Bnri. OF BIGHTS (1958), Judge Hand's criticism of judicial
review was not as dlearly responsive to the direct-indirect dichotomy; yet be-
cause most of the open-ended constitutional provisions are of the direct type,
his line of attack was not greatly different. It was this last volume of
Learned Hand's which spurred Professor Wechsler to his classic challenge
of the Judge in Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Hakv. L. REv. 1 (1959), wherein he insisted that the Court could con-
tinue its full engagement in judicial review of constitutionality, yet avoid be-
coming a super-legislature, by resting its decisions upon neutral principles.
Despite the criticism brought down upon his views, Professor Wechsler has
not changed his mind. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLumT.
L. RFv. 1001, 1011 (1965).
59328 U.S. 303 (1946).60381 U.S. 437 (1965) cited and discussed in the text at note 38.
61 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), complete a trend
evident for a quarter century.
62 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (Part I); American
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) (Part II) cf. Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965), in light of the dissent of Mr. Justice Black.63 Youmgstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
64 See the writers evaluation of this (ad)venture in Toward an Acceptable
Function of Judicial Revtew?, 11 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1966), constituting the 1965
Dillion Lecture at the University of South Dakota.
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reshaping the thrust of indirect limitation. Under indirect limita-
tion, the fractionalization of the totality of governmental power
strengthens the free play of institutional oppositions which in turn
effect the continuing accommodation of conflicting forces in the
society. Constitutional judicial review of Bill-of-Rights type limita-
tions, if means and end were to become inverted, could transform
itself into a potent weapon for judicial employment in the dynamics
of institutional oppositions.
Such metamorphosis, by stripping the Court of its protective
armor of apparent detachment and thrusting it unreservedly into
the very vortex of politics, might well come at a high price. A
generation ago two quite different students of the Court warned
of their respective concerns. Professor Corwin felt that the result
of emancipation of judicial review "from all documentary and
doctrinal restraints" was "to obliterate the frontier between Con-
stitutional Law and policy; and without a definite boundary to
defend, Judicial Review itself becomes an instrument of policy,
and thereby exposes itself more and more to political criticism." 5
Charles Curtis put the matter this way: "...the harder the Court
tugs at the words and the meaning of the Constitution, the farther
it gets from the Constitution and the basis of its prestige and
power.""6 The warnings of yesterday's generation would seem to
hold equal validity for today's and tomorrow's. One may follow
Dean Rostow in rejection of Learned Hand's advocacy of Court
abandonment of direct constitutional judicial review, yet hold to
the view that that form of review must be exercised with the
severest intellectual detachment of which Justices are capable.
Power politics is not a game the Court should play.
65 Corwin, The Dissolving Structure of Our Constitutional Law, 20 WASH.
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